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Abstract  
The focus of this paper is to share research carried out over a four year period to assess passengers 
experience and opinions of security measures’ Airside’ at UK airports introduced as a result of 
terrorism since 9/11.  The respondent profile was university students, 93% of whom were aged 
between 18-25.  A survey was carried out between 2011 and 2014 at Leeds Beckett University of 
711 respondents who have had 3867 security experiences, both leaving and returning to UK 
airports.  All major UK airports were included in the survey.  The data suggests younger passengers 
do take longer to pass through security and there are significant differences of opinion between 
whites and non-white on who should be profiled for security screening. 
 
Introduction 
Since 9/11, security at airports globally has changed significantly for all travellers including 
tourists.2  Security measures have been introduced in attempt to prevent another 9/11 
hijacking by securing cockpit doors, preventing liquid bombs by limiting liquids,3 checking 
shoes4 and full-body scanning passengers for hidden explosive devices.5 The latest 
                                                          
1 Leeds Law School. Leeds Beckett University. s.m.wood@leedsbeckett.ac.uk 
2 The 9/11 Commission Report August 2004 <http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf> 
(accessed 09/07/14) ch1. 
3 Casciani D ‘Liquid bomb plot: What happened’ BBC News <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8242479.stm>   
(accessed 10/05/14) 
4 United States of America v. Richard Colvin Reid, [2002] US District Court, District of Massachusetts. 16 
January 2002. 11 Facts Richard Reid known as the Shoe Bomber, is an Englishman who attempted to detonate 
explosives packed into the shoes he was wearing, while on American Airlines Flight 63 from Paris to Miami in 
December 2001 <http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2002/01/16/reidindictment.pdf> 
(accessed 24/01/12) 
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inconvenience to air-passengers travelling to the UK is the restriction on laptops being 
allowed into the aircraft cabin from certain countries.6  
These measures have one thing in common, they are focused on countering terrorism as 
passengers pass through electronic security and onto the aircraft, the part of the airport known 
as ‘Airside.’ Since 2007, however some terrorists have changed tack, exploding or attempting 
to detonate bombs ‘landside’ at airports departure and arrival gates.  Glasgow 2007,7 Russia 
in 20118 and more recently Brussels9 and Istanbul's Ataturk 201610 have used a different 
terrorist methods. These soft landside targets have given terrorists a unique opportunity to 
load large amounts of explosives onto airport trolleys, cars or in suicide vests with terrifying 
consequences for passengers.   
Following 9/11, the new security measures at airports has affected the passenger experience, 
whether it is the time it takes them to clear security, items that have been confiscated,  
professionalism and empowerment of security staff, or the perceived treatment of ethnic 
minorities, particularly the Muslim community.11  These recent attacks have had another but 
more profound effect on passenger experience at airports. Beck (2009) suggests that 
terrorism, like global warming, is a new paradigm of risk assessment.12  Risk assessment of 
terrorism can no longer be attributed just to Governments or insurance provides, indeed it is 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
5 BBC News ’ Underwear bomber Abdulmutallab sentenced to life’ A Nigerian man Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab, 16 February 2012   <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-US-canada-17065130>  (accessed 
12/05/14) 
6 BBC News US and UK laptop bans on some Middle East flights come into effect 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-39391562>  25 March 2017 accessed 27 March 2017 
7 Townsend, M Revill, J and  Townsend P,K  ‘Terror threat 'critical' as Glasgow attacked’ The Guardian 
Newspaper 1 July 2007  <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/jul/01/terrorism.world2>  (accessed 
15/06/15) 
8 Harding L and Parfitt, T ‘The Guardian ‘Domodedovo airport hit by deadly bombing’ 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/24/domodedovo-airport-bombing-moscow (accessed 
24/07/16). 
9 Holehouse, M ‘Brussels attacks: Security scanners 'could be installed at airport entrances' in wake of bomb 
terror’  The Telegraph 25 March 2016 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/belgium/12202315/Brussels-attacks-Security-
scanners-could-be-installed-at-airport-entrances-in-wake-of-bomb-terror.html> (accessed 25/04/16)   
10 Letsch C and Woolf, N ‘Turkey airport attack: 41 killed in explosions at Istanbul Atatürk’ 
The Guardian 29 June 2016 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/28/turkey-airport-explosions-
ataturak-istanbul (accessed 24/07/16) 
11 Innes, M Roberts, C and Innes, H with Lowe, T and Lakhan, S (2011) ‘Assessing the Effects of Prevent 
Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers, Cardiff: Universities’ Police Studies Institute 2011.  
 Kepel G (2004) ‘The war of Muslim minds’ Islam and the west,’ (Harvard University Press 2004), Ruschmann, P 
edt: Marzilli, (2005) A ‘The War on Terror’ 2nd edn  (Infobase Publishing) and 11 Lambert, R (2008) ‘Salafi and 
Islamist Londoners: Stigmatised minority faith communities countering al-Qaida’ Crime Law Social Change 50: 
73-89 Also Blackwell, L, Hopkins, N and Reicher, S (2013) ‘I know who I am, who do they think I am?: Muslim 
perspectives on encounters with airport authorities’. Ethnic and Racial Studies 36(6) –pp 1090 – 1108 
12 Beck U (2009)‘World at Risk’  (Polity Press) 
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the passengers who must also consider and measure the risk of terrorism to their journey and 
destination before they travel. 
Reviewing passenger experience of security UK airports is not unique to the research 
reported in this paper.  The UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) have been researching 
passenger experience of security yearly since 2008 at a number of major UK airports to find 
out what passenger think of such things as items they are required remove, the 
professionalism of security staff or the time it had taken them to clear security.13  However, 
there are significant differences between the CAA surveys and this study. This survey asked 
respondents their opinions on whether ethnic minorities warranted further attention and 
respondent attitude towards profiling passengers in general.  In this research the age profile 
was unique.  The CAA surveys have a varied age group, but terrorists who have carried out 
attacks against the West since 9/11 have commonly been Muslim males aged between 18 -35.  
Therefore age was an important factor in choosing the respondents for this survey. That is not 
to suggest there is no female participation in terrorism, historically women have played both 
supporting and leading roles in terrorist conflicts.14However, in the new war of Al-Qaida 
inspired terror threats, between 1999 and 2009 only five women have been convicted of 
terrorist related offences in the UK.15 It has been suggested that there is no gender imbalance 
for the support of extremist views and many females have travelled to Syria in support of Isis 
since the conflict started.16  
 
University students 
Many terrorists have attended UK universities consequently the rationale for using this 
profile was to consider whether this had any bearing in the respondents experiences at UK 
airport security.  The following individuals are a small sample of students who have attended 
universities in the UK and gone onto commit a terrorist offence.   
• Kafeel Ahmed died following an attack on Glasgow airport in July 2007 in which his jeep 
packed with incendiary material exploded.  Ahmed was originally from Bangalore but 
studied engineering at Queens University Belfast and had a PhD in computational fluid 
dynamics at Anglia Ruskin University.17 
                                                          
13 Civil Aviation Authority ‘Passenger’ Experiences of Air Travel’ Eighth Report of Session 2006-07 vol 1. June 
21st 2012    <http://www.dft.gov.uk/statistics/releases/air-passenger-experience-of-security-screening-
results-caa-survey-module-2011>  accessed 27 June 2012 AND The National Association of Airline Passengers   
‘Congressional Briefing’ TSA, failure by Numbers (2008) 
14 Margaret Gonzalez-Perez.(2009) ‘Women and Terrorism: Female Activity in Domestic and International 
Terror Groups, (Routledge) 
15 Simcox, R Stuart, H  Ahmed, H and Murray D (2010) ‘The British Connections ’(2nd edn The centre for social 
cohesion) 
16 The Home Affairs Select Committee ‘Roots of violent radicalisation’ (19th  Report of Session 2010–12 
volume I January 2012) p9 
17John Thorne and Hannah Stuart (2008) ‘Islam on Campus, A survey of student opinions’, (Published by The 
centre for social cohesion) p3 
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• Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab a Nigerian who, at the age of 23, was convicted of 
attempting to detonate plastic explosives hidden in his underwear while on board 
Northwest Airlines Flight 253, from Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan, on Christmas Day, 
2009.  He studied Engineering and Business Finance at University College London (UCL) 
in September 2005. From 2006-2007 he was the president of the Islamic society at UCL. 
• Abdulla Ahmed Ali, the leader of the liquid bomb plot in 2006, which intended to bring 
down aircraft flying from the UK to the U.S.  He was an engineering graduate at City 
University in 2002.  Involved in the same plot was Assad Sarwar who had turned down a 
place at university in Chichester because he was homesick. But his second attempt at 
higher education was at Brunel, first with a sports science course, then earth sciences, also 
failed because he found the work too hard. 
• The masked Islamic State militant known as "Jihadi John", who has been pictured in the 
videos of the beheadings of Western hostages, named as Mohammed Emwazi from 
London. He was raised in a middle class area of West London and studied computer 
programming at the University of Westminster.18 
• Suicide bomber, 22-year-old Salman Abedi, in May 2017, detonated a home-made device 
at Manchester Arena killing 22 and injuring 64 people.  Abedi attended Salford University 
in 2014.19 
 
A report published by the Home Affairs Select Committee, ‘Roots of Violent Radicalisation’, 
it suggested that the internet plays a far greater role in radicalisation than universities, prisons 
or mosques. It added that the focus placed on university campuses by the government's 
‘Prevent’ strategy has been "disproportionate"20which may suggest that the role universities 
have in promoting terrorism is overstated.  However, the report accuses some universities of 
being "complacent" about their role in confronting violent extremist views.  It adds: 
‘universities are ideal places to confront extremist ideology, [but] we are not convinced that 
extremists on campus are always subject to equal and robust challenge’.21Professor Geoff 
Petts, representing Universities UK suggested that ‘universities acknowledge the threat, but I 
do not see any evidence to support that’. 22 Some students who have taken interest in courses 
                                                          
18 Manning, L (2015) 'Jihadi John' named as Mohammed Emwazi from London’  26 February BBC News online 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-31637090>   (accessed 26/02/15) 
19 Mathew Weaver and Claire Phillps ‘Manchester attack: police raids continue in hunt for terror network’ The 
Guardian 24th May 2017 
20 Jack Grove (2014) ‘Campus links with terrorism 'overstated' Times Higher Education 9 February 2012 
<https://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/news/campUS-links-with-terrorism-overstated/418965.article> 
accessed 26 January.  
21 The Home Affairs Select Committee (2012) ‘Roots of violent radicalisation’ (19th Report of Session 2010–12 
vol I January) 
22 ibid 14 
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related to foreign affairs appear to have been unjustly treated by xenophobic university staff 
and police.23  
There is little evidence to suggest that UK universities are a fertile ground for recruiting 
terrorists or that campus extremism is prevalent.  Universities will always remain an 
opportunity to connect young impressionable individuals throughout the world of different 
faiths and of different political views.  This is one rational why the British government in 
2015 introduced positive duties on universities to prevent students becoming radicalised in 
their institutions.24   
There are around 2.3 million students in higher education in Britain, approximately 90.000 
are Muslim.25 Universities are places of student vulnerability, because students are of an 
impressionable age and it is where many students are away from home for the first-time.26  
Radical thinkers can prey on weaker students or students who are looking for more purpose 
in life becoming susceptible to radical views.   This process radicalisation of young men is 
made much easier with Muslim students because it is possible to point to perceived and 
actual examples discrimination, harassment and occupation of Muslim lands by Western 
forces.  This is an irony for a country and university population culture that is both diverse 
and largely welcoming of multi faiths with the concept of free speech endorsed in the 
Education (No 2) Act 1986.27     
 
Aviation security  
UK airport security, as in many other countries, operates in two ways: electronic screening 
and policing. The former is the focus of the CAA research on passenger experience, the latter 
has had less scientific enquiry28 until recently (Choudhury and Fenwick (2011),29 Hurrell 
                                                          
23Thornton, R (2011) ‘Radicalisation at universities or radicalisation by universities?: How a student’s use of a 
library book became a “major Islamist plot” Paper prepared for the Critical Studies on Terrorism on Teaching 
About Terrorism panel at the British International Studies Association Conference, University of Manchester, 
April. 
24 Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, Part 5, Risk of Being drawn Into Terrorism.  Chapter 1, Preventing 
people being drawn into terrorism part 25. A General Duty on specified authorities 
25The Higher Education Statistics Agency  <https://www.hesa.ac.uk/content/view/3129/#eth> (accessed 
10/10/14) 
26 Professor Neumann (2012) in The Home Affairs Select Committee ‘Roots of violent radicalisation’ (19th  
Report of Session 2010–12 Volume I January)15 Quest p369  
27 Glees, A (2014) ‘Islamist Terrorism and British Universities’ Chapter 10 in Colin Murry Parkes,  ‘Responses to 
Terrorism’ Can psychosocial approaches break the cycle of violence? (Routledge)  
28Lum, C Kennedy, L. W. and Sherley, A. J. (2006).’The Effectiveness of Counter Terrorism Strategies’,  
http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/project/11/  (accessed 10/05/14) 
29 Choudhury, T and Fenwick, H (2011) ‘The impact of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim communities’ 
(Equality and Human Rights Commission Research report) 72 
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(2013),30 Leda et al (2012)31 and Langley (2014).32These two process are controlled by 
airport governance through local risk assessment policies.  Risk assessment policies have 
been developing in the UK and elsewhere since the Lockerbie incident in 1989,33 following 
which it was decided that luggage could not be transported without the passenger, referred to 
as ‘Accounting and Authorising for Carriage’ or the ‘Triple A’.34 Security reviews of UK 
aviation and broader modes of transport carried out by Sir John Wheeler (2002) and Boy 
Smith in 2006 resulted in legislative changes to aviation security.  ‘The Policing and Crime 
Act 2009’ (PCA) highlights the principle of joint accountability from different security 
stakeholders and endorsed the Multi-Agency Threat and Risk Assessment (MATRA).  The 
MATRA approach was designed to enhance liaison between key stakeholders of security in 
aviation to assess risks.  
Risk assessment in the UK is required to comply with EU Regulation 300/2008 which 
harmonises airport security across the EU. The details of what action is required is contained 
in regulation 2015/1998 and compliance is governed by Regulation 72/2010. Security 
Management System (SeMS) and ‘Outcome Focused Risk Based’ security are the latest risk 
assessment strategies to engage UK airports operators. 35   SeMS is not an EU requirement, 
and is likely to survive Brexit.  It is supported by the CAA who are interested in developing 
this risk assessment tool across the UK aviation sector.36 
Screening passengers applies to everyone wanting to enter Airside. Passengers are asked to 
remove items and place them in a plastic tray for screening. Liquids of 100ml or less are to be 
placed in a clear plastic bag and passengers are required to pass through a metal detector.  
Any person triggering the metal detector is patted down and frequently full-body scanned this 
includes shoes being removed for screening. Data from the CAA passenger experience 
surveys support high levels of security. The challenge for UK airports is to process more than 
                                                          
30Hurrell, K, (2013) ‘An Experimental Analysis of Examinations and Detentions under Schedule 7 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000’, (Equality and Human Rights Commission Briefing Paper 8.) p7 
31 Blackwell, L  Hopkins, N and Reicher, S ‘I know who I am, who do they think I am?: Muslim perspectives on 
encounters with airport authorities’. Ethnic and Racial Studies 36(6) pp 1090 – 1108 
32Brandon R. Langley ‘ A randomised control trial comparing the effects of procedural justice to experienced 
utility theories in airport security’ January 2014 
<http://www.crim.cam.ac.uk/alumni/theses/Langley,%20B.%20A%20randomised%20control%20trial%20comp
aring%20the%20effects%20of%20procedural%20justice%20to%20experienced%20utility%20theories%20in%2
0airport%20security%20stops.pdf> (accessed 01/08/2016) 
33 Wallis, R ‘Lockerbie (2001) The Story and the Lessons’ (Preager Publishers) 
34 Butcher, L (2011) ‘Aviation Security’ standard note,House of Commons Business and Transport department 
p3 
35 Ministry of Transport  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/8632/reforming-aviation-
security.pdf> Reforming Aviation Security A new model for security regulation (accessed 06/05/14). 
36 AOA Security Conference Security Management Systems (SeMS) – A Regulator’s Perspective & UK SeMS 
Roll-out May 16- 17 Oulton Hall Leeds UK 2016  AND Airport Security Summit, Security Management Systems 
(SeMS) – A Regulator’s Perspective & UK SeMS Roll-out’ Barcelona 19-20 May, 2016. 
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220 million passengers a year as quickly and as safely as possible.  This is why a significant 
investment has been made in new technology at airports, trialling new security methods such 
as remote screening of passenger’s hand luggage.  This effectively means airports such as 
Gatwick can now screen carry-on baggage anywhere in the world.  
 
Profiling passengers 
Following 9/11, the US has become the leading force against terrorism and military action in 
the Middle East,37which makes it the desired target of militants.38   In October 2003, the US 
Transport Security Association (TSA) piloted a programme in three airports called Screening 
of Passengers by Observations Techniques (SPOT) carried out by Behaviour Detection 
Officers (BDO) for the purpose of counter-terrorism.39  The US Government Accountability 
Office’s (GAO) report suggested that SPOT was carried out without any scientific basis, and 
questioned the programme’s reliability.40 The TSA responded by identifying that no other 
programme of this nature had ever been scientifically assessed prior to implementation.41  
The GAO acknowledged the difficulties in measuring the success of such a programme, 
because profiling passengers is not based on science but on the judgements of individual 
security staffs, which can be at times unreliable and create inconsistencies. Despite these 
concerns, in 2007 the programme was up-scaled and rolled out to 42 airports employing 644 
BDO officers.  By 2012 the programme had increased staffing in excess of 2800 at 142 
airports.42  No terrorist has been caught at an airport as a result of the SPOT programme, 
despite 199 arrests for other crimes.43 In 2013 the programme was reviewed as lacking a clear 
strategic plan to identify priorities and establish clear outcomes, when costs having increased 
to $878 million.44A report sent to the GAO recommended that future funding for the 
programme needed to be limited.45 The training of officers for the programme, particularly 
                                                          
37 Pillar, P, R (2001) ‘Terrorism and US Foreign Policy’  (The Brookings Institution) 
38 ibid  
39 ibid  
40 Government Accountability Office ‘TSA’s Passenger Screening Behaviour Detection Program Underway, but 
Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Validation and Address Operational Challenges’ May 2010 
<http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/304510.pdf> (accessed 10/02/13)  
41 ibid  
42 Department of Homeland Security, ‘Office of Inspector General Transportation Security Administration’s 
Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques’. May 2013 
<https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2013/OIG_13-91_May13.pdf> (accessed 14/07/14)  
43 ibid p5 
44 ibid  
45 Government Accountability Office TSA Should Limit Future Funding for Behaviour Detection Activities 
November 2013 <http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/658923.pdf> (accessed 30/01/14)  
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the refresher courses, were identified as ineffective,46 questioning the professionalism of 
officers in stopping passengers and running a real risk of ethnic profiling. A programme that 
had grown out of 9/11 for very good reasons has become dysfunctional and lacks real 
purpose of what its objectives are more than a decade after 9/11.  
In 2006, the UK contemplated a greater use of passenger profiling for stop and search 
following the liquid bomb attempt on aviation.47  In July 2009, Lord Carlile who was then the 
Independent Reviewer for Terrorist Legislation, published his report.48 Commenting on 
Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (TA 2000), he said ‘In the past I have suggested 
repeatedly that the number of random or intuitive stops could be reduced considerably.’49 
Indeed, David Anderson, the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism confirmed in his 
June 2012 report that the majority, if not all, of examinations were intelligence led or had 
some element of intelligence that had resulted in convictions, rather than relying on intuition, 
profiling or a “coppers nose” hunch.50   
Schedule 7 of the TA 2000 applies to ‘ports’ which includes both seaports and airports. The 
examining officer can either be a constable, immigration officer, or a customs officer who is 
designated by the Secretary of State. 51 The examining officer can detain a passenger and ask 
questions for a maximum period of 6 hours52 and detain property up to 7 days to determine 
whether or not the passenger is a terrorist.53  However, there is no need for the examining 
officer to have reasonable suspicion or grounds for suspecting the passenger is a terrorist at 
the point the passenger is stopped. 54 Parliament has set the bar for the exercise of Schedule 7 
power at quite a low level.55 Passengers who wilfully fail to comply with or wilfully obstruct, 
the examining officer can be liable on a summary conviction to up to three month 
imprisonment. 
                                                          
46 Department of Homeland Security, ‘Office of Inspector General Transportation Security Administration’s 
Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques’. May 2013 
<https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2013/OIG_13-91_May13.pdf> (accessed 14/07/14)  
47 Webster, B (2006) ‘Muslims face extra checks in new travel crackdown’ The Times August 15 p1 
48 Terrorism Act 2000 and part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 
49 Lord Carlile of Berriew Report on the operation in 2009 of the Terrorism act 2000 and of part 1 of the 
Terrorism Act 2006 July 2009 Para 192, 37 Presented to Parliament pursuant to s 36 of the Terrorism Act 2006. 
(Crown Copyright 2009) 
50   The Report of the independent reviewer on the Operation of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of The 
Terrorism Act 2006  pursuant to s36 of the Terrorism Act 2000 July 2012, 9. p46 
51 Schedule 7 TA 2000 1 (1) 
52 Schedule 7 TA 2000 6 (4) 
53 Schedule 7 TA 11. (2) (a) 
54 Schedule 7 TA 2000 2 (4) 
55 David Miranda v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 6 para 58 
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Schedule 7 has proved controversial and although a stream of cases has been brought forward 
to challenge its legal authority none has yet succeeded in establishing that the scheme is 
flawed or does not offer sufficient legal protection against individual Human Rights abuses at 
UK boarders.56  Schedule 7 may be less of a concern following a public consultation and 
subsequent changes to Schedule 7 to allow greater accountability with a new Code of 
Practice.   The 2014 Code of Practice makes some important changes in the way screening 
and recording of passengers should be carried out under Schedule 7.  The emphasis here is 
the accountability between initial screening and the point when the matter becomes an 
examination and then a detention.  The Code of Practice is clear in encouraging officers to 
undertake examinations quickly and draw conclusion early to determine whether any further 
examination is necessary.  Examinations should be able to ascertain within the hour whether 
or not it will be necessary to detain a person.  Detention must now be exercised before the 
first hour of the examination has been completed.  The operational application of Schedule 7 
in a manner envisaged by governmental officials can only be realised by continued 
professional development of examining officers. A failure to do so may see similar mistakes 
as was experienced in the US SPOT programme.  There has to be some latitude and 
autonomy of the application of a system that is difficult to audit and reliant on 
professionalism of security offices, particularly at the screening stage when screening 
becomes an examination. The list of examples in the Code is not exhaustive. The triggers to 
detain a person for examination, range from the obvious obstructive person, who is 
uncooperative in being screened, to the officer’s intuition or ‘gut reaction’ 
Schedule 7 still remains a powerful tool to stop, search and detain passengers.  Tensions 
between ethnic communities are likely to continue particularly in light of Muslim British 
Nationals traveling to Syria to fight and the risk of them returning to the UK.57  The 
introduction of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, designed to strengthen the 
prevention of individuals going to fight abroad will focus on Muslims at airports, 
consequently their community is likely to be targeted on flights traveling near the Syrian 
region. It is likely both this Act and Schedule 7 will work together rationalising their use at 
airports, particularly in light of recent terrorist attacks on airports. 
 
Hypotheses testing 
This project reviewed three research questions covering both ‘Airside’ and ‘Landside’ 
security at UK airports.   
                                                          
56 CC v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2011] EWHC 3316 (Admin), [2012] 2 All ER 1004, [2012] 1 
WLR 1913, R (Elosta) v MPC [2013] EWHC 3397 (QB), David Miranda v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2014] EWHC p255, David Miranda v SSHD [2016], Beghal v DPP EWCA Civ 6 para p58, [2015] 
UKSC 49,  On appeal from: [2013] EWHC 2573 and Sabure Malik v UK Application no. 32968/11  32968/11 
(Judgment (Struck out of the List) : Court (First Section)), [2016] ECHR p605  
57 BBC News ‘Hundreds of Britons fighting in Syria - MI5 chief’ 7 November 2013 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24856553> (accessed 18/09/14) 
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• Do younger passengers take longer to go through security and if so why? 
• Do younger passengers accept the levels of security at UK airports? 
• What has been the impact of terrorism on the attitudes of young passengers?  
From these research question three hypotheses were designed. The legitimacy of profiling 
foreign nationals or British Asians Muslims to determine whether they are terrorists or have 
links with terrorists has gained traction since 9/11.  For these reasons the survey does in part 
ask the respondents their views about these ethnic groups, albeit indirectly, for example 
asking who should be profiled at UK airports.  This will allow an insight of opinion, belief 
and perception of respondents as well and actual experience for those who have been stopped 
and asked questions at UK airports. 
Ethnic profiling is supported by qualitative and quantitative data to suggest that there is some 
evidence profiling ethnic minorities does occasionally occur.58  Events such as 7/7 and in 
2006 the liquid bomb attempt, do suggest that following 9/11 male Muslims are more likely 
to carry out terrorist attacks than white British Nationals.59  Data is available on a broader 
qualitative basis regarding the use of terrorism legislation and general stop and search powers 
with negative effects on Muslim communities.60 Choudhury and Fenwick’s qualitative data 
study reviewed the effects of UK terrorism legislation following 9/11.  Although their 
research covers a relatively small group of individuals on a wide range of terrorist powers.  It 
is widely referenced because there are so few projects of a credible nature that have 
conducted in depth focus group discussions with the Muslim community.61 Choudhury and 
Fenwick state that no non-Muslim participants in their data collection were stopped under 
Schedule 7, but that Schedule 7 is having a negative effect on the Muslim community.62  
In 2012 Leda and others carried out individual and group interviews with 38 Scottish 
Muslims concerning their encounters with authority, especially those at British airports.63 In 
general relationships between minorities and the police have often been difficult, created 
mistrust and data suggests Muslims are stopped by the police more often than the non-
                                                          
58 Greer, S ‘ The myth of the ‘securitised Muslim Community’ The Social Impact of post-9/11 counter-
terrorism law and policy in the west, ch 26 400 in Routledge Handbook of law and Terrorism 2015 
59 Webster, B (2006) ‘Muslims face extra checks in new travel crackdown’ The Times August 15th 1 
60 Choudhury T and Fenwick H (2011) ‘The impact of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim communities’ 
(Equality and Human Rights Commission Research report) p72 
61 ibid p22 
62 ibid p28 
63 Blackwell, L Hopkins, N and Reicher, S (2013) ‘I know who I am, who do they think I am?: Muslim 
perspectives on encounters with airport authorities’. Ethnic and Racial Studies 36(6) –pp 1090 -1108  
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Muslim majority.64Their findings were more than often negative encounters at airports with 
authority based on their respondents’ perception of being Muslim.65 
Langley’s work on policing Schedule 7 was carried out in 2013 with 775 respondents at West 
Midlands Airport.66  Langley reviewed using the scientific method of a random control test 
‘The effects of procedural justice to experienced utility theories in airport security’ with a 
central focus ‘legitimacy’. Langley’s unique research complements the 2012 public 
consultation of Schedule 7 outcome.  Langley’s research supports the procedural justice 
theory of policing i.e. trust, relationships, or ‘the way in which legislation was practically 
implemented and applied by officials’67 The new 2014 code of practice is focussed on a more 
considered approach to the application of Schedule 7 with better training for officers. Langley 
was testing methods of policing against two models rather the notion of ethnic profiling, 
nevertheless his work is of rigorous scientific value for policing at UK boarders. 
Hurrell has undertaken experimental quantitative research into how Schedule 7 is being 
applied, drawing upon secondary data from the CAA, the national census and the police.68  
Hurrell suggests there is statistical evidence, albeit reducing since 2011, that the Asian 
community is more likely than the white British to undergo Schedule 7 questioning.  The 
analysis is without a definitive significance level because of the nature of the experimental 
research using secondary statistics and trying to triangulate them.69 It could therefore be 
argued that if there is ‘some’ evidence to suggest discrimination in the aviation security 
process and this could be used to develop an alternative hypothesis rather than suggesting, as 
this research does, the null hypotheses there is no difference in treatment between white and 
non-white passengers.  
Government literature and the Codes of Practice in 2009 and 2014 relating to the 
implementation of Schedule 7 clearly state that no-one should be stopped and searched solely 
on the grounds of ethnicity.70David Anderson, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism 
Legislation, suggested in a number of his reports that the statistics so far concerning Schedule 
                                                          
64 Thiel, D. (2009) ‘Policing Terrorism ‘ A Review of the Evidence’, London: The Police Foundation 
65 Leda and others 1103-1107 
66 Langley, B, R (2014) ‘ A randomised control trial comparing the effects of procedural justice to experienced 
utility theories in airport security January 
<http://www.crim.cam.ac.uk/alumni/theses/Langley,%20B.%20A%20randomised%20control%20trial%20comp
aring%20the%20effects%20of%20procedural%20justice%20to%20experienced%20utility%20theories%20in%2
0airport%20security%20stops.pdf> (accessed 01/08/16) 
67 ibid 25 
68 Chapter 1 ‘Risk Assessment at airports as result of 9/11’  pp 17 - 21 
69 Hurrell, K (2013) ‘An Experimental Analysis of Examinations and Detentions under Schedule 7 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000’, (Equality and Human Rights Commission Briefing Paper 8.) p7 
70 Schedule 7 Code of Practice <https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/schedule-7-code-of-practice> 
(accessed 12/07/15)  
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7 do not indicated the power is being exercised in a discriminatory way.71  For this reason the 
hypothesis in this survey is: 
• Airports security applies risk assessment equally to all passengers at UK airports. 
(𝑯𝟎null)72 
The hypothesis relating to the time it takes passengers to go through security at UK airports (set out 
below) is based upon the commercial interests of airport operators to process passenger numbers 
efficiently and the specific respondent profile used in this research that might draw attention from 
security. Time and security are competing factors for passengers and airport operators. Millions of 
pounds are spent every year nationally improving technology to screen passengers and their luggage 
for security threats as quickly as possible,   In order to test this hypothesis there will be a descriptive 
analysis between this research and that of the CAA. 
• Age is not a factor in the time it takes to go through UK airport security. (𝑯𝟎null) 
The third hypothesis makes the presumption that following 9/11 and other terrorist attempts 
and attacks passengers are accepting of the level of security at UK airports even though it can 
lead to longer waiting times and the use of new technology such as full-body scanners.  
Because of the respondent age profile it is possible to review a unique insight into their 
opinions of UK airport security. 
• Young passengers are supportive of high levels of security at UK airports (𝑯𝟎null) 
The CAA established from 2008-2012 that there was a high level of passenger support for 
tight security at UK airports.73  However, this data had was drawn from all passengers’ ages, 
rather than a particular age profile.  This hypotheses will be analysed through cross tabulated 
data from a number of question that have been asked of the respondents in the questionnaire 
and through their open comments. 
 
Summary of data74 
• 711 respondents participated in the survey.  
• 64% of all 3867 security experiences were from Manchester and Leeds Bradford airport. 
                                                          
71 Anderson, D. (2015) Report on the Operation in 2014 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism 
Act 2006, September,  <https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/Independent-Review-of-Terrorism-Report-2014-print2.pdf> (accessed 12/10/15), 
p28 
72 Alternatively - there is no association between ethnicity and security checks 
73 Department of Transport, ‘Air passenger experience of security screening: 2013’ Statistical release 18 June 
2014 <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/320594/air-
passenger-experience-of-security-screening-2013.pdf> accessed July 2014 
74 Data percentage was rounded up for the purpose of this section 
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• Ethnicity, age, sex remained consistent and stable throughout the survey with averages of 
62% female 38% male 42% non-white and 93% respondents in the age bracket of 18-25. 
• 27% of respondents who said they were aware of airport security requirements incorrectly 
answer questions relating to airport security.  
• 96% of respondents agree with the current level of security checks. 
• 62% of respondents agreed that security staff were right to confiscate items while 38% 
disagreed. 
• 18% of respondents had been stopped by customs officers.  Females suggested that they 
were 7% more likely to be treated professionally than male respondents. Those 
respondents who claimed unprofessional behaviour suggested either attitude or simply 
being picked out whilst other passenger had not as their reasons. 
• 20% of respondents claim profiling is a good idea because it is obvious who the likely 
terrorists are. 
• 18% female and 36% males disagree that profiling is good to target passengers acting 
suspiciously.  The majority agree. 
• 21% male and 11% female agree that profiling is an opportunity to harass ethnic 
minorities and that more ethnic minorities have agreed with the statement than white 
British.  The majority disagree. 
• Males suggest they go through passport control and security quicker than females 
• The majority of males and females expect to wait between 10 to 20 minutes to go through 
passport control and security.   The majority expected it to take between 15-20 minutes 
and most believed it did take 15 to 20 minutes to go through security and passport control. 
• 83% female and 77% males find airport security an important part of their air travel.  
 
Hypotheses testing  
• Age is not a factor in the time it takes to go through UK airport security. 𝑯𝟎(null) 
The basis of measuring this hypothesis was reviewing the data set in this research (ITR) and 
measuring it against the CAA data set.  In both sets of data ‘time’ is that perceived by the 
respondent rather than independently measured. The CAA states that respondents tend to 
overestimate their queuing time and placed caution on their data time.  The analysis is 
descriptive using cross tabulated data ITR and from the CAA.  
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Table 1 below indicates CAA sample age group in 2014 and shows the high level of young 
passengers travelling through Stansted.  ITR 93% of the respondents were aged between 16-25. 
 
Table 1 
Age 
Heathrow Gatwick Stansted Luton Manchester All 5 
16-24 
14% 16% 19% 11% 12% 15% 
25-34 
25% 21% 31% 23% 17% 23% 
35-44 
21% 16% 17% 19% 17% 18% 
45-54 
18% 18% 15% 18% 24% 19% 
55-64 
13% 17% 11% 16% 20% 15% 
65 & 
over 8% 12% 7% 12% 11% 10% 
 
The CAA data from 2008 to 2014 shows a steady but small increase in waiting times, 
particularly in the latter years.75  The CAA data from 2008 to 2012 showed that the biggest 
marked increase in waiting time was at Manchester which in 2008 was 3.8 minutes  
increasing to 7.0 minutes in 201276 and 9.8 minutes in 2014.77    Since 2008 the CAA 
respondent average perceived queuing time has gradually increased, with the exception of 
Gatwick, to 7.1 minutes in 2013 and to 7.0 minutes in 2014.78   
The majority of respondents ITR claimed to have taken between 10 and 20 minutes79 to pass 
through security suggesting that younger passengers take longer to go through security when 
measured against the CAA data outlined above. 
The CAA have a wide age range of respondents as seen in Table 1, however the age profile at 
Stansted is relatively young, with 50% respondent’s in 2014 aged between 16- 34 years.80  
Stansted has consistently returned higher waiting times than the other four airports used by 
the CAA in their data collection.  Stansted in 2014 returned an average waiting time of 10.1 
minutes.81  Therefore based on frequency statistics the null hypotheses can be rejected, that 
                                                          
75 Department of Transport ‘Air passenger experience of security screening’ 2012, 2013 and 2014 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/air-passenger-experience-of-security-screening (accessed 
12/04/16) 
76 ibid 2012 p6 
77 ibid 2014 p8 
78 ibid 2014 p6 
79 See Table p24,25 and 26  pp 238-240 
80 ibid p12 
81 ibid 2014 p6 
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is, that age is not a factor in going through security, consequently meaning that younger 
passengers take longer to go through security.   
• Airports security applies risk assessment equally to all passengers in UK airports 
(𝑯𝟎null) 
The assessment of this hypothesis is from respondents opinions.  The data set was recoded 
from a long list of ethnicity to just two category’s White and non-white to enable a Pearson 
Chi-Square 𝑥2 (Nonparametric test). 
 
 Question when stopped were you dealt with professionally?  
 
 Were you dealt with 
professionally? 
Total 
Yes No 
White and Non-white 
categories 
White 206 12 218 
Non-white 81 12 93 
Total 287 24 311 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
White and Non-white 
categories * Were you 
dealt with professionally? 
311 43.7% 400 56.3% 711 100.0% 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
  
Pearson Chi-Square 5.011a 1 .025   
Continuity Correctionb 4.026 1 .045   
      
      
      
      
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count 
is 7.18. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Although the overwhelming majority of respondents who had been stopped (287 or 92%) 
agree that they were dealt with professionally, differences are observed in the proportions of 
White and Non-White who disagreed. A Chi-square test was carried out to see if these 
differences were significant.  The expected count in all cells was five or more so the test is 
valid.  According to the test (𝑃 =  .025) which is less than the specified .05 (𝑎 = .05).  
Therefore from this example the 𝐻0 is rejected, consequently risk assessment does not apply 
equally to all passengers in the experience of these respondents.  However, more ethnicity 
tests will be carried out on different ethnicity questions in an attempt to triangulate this data. 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
White and Non-white 
categories Question 
Profiling gives an 
opportunity for security to 
harass ethnic minorities 
709 99.7% 2 0.3% 711 100.0% 
 
 
 
Question Profiling gives an opportunity for security staff to harass ethnic 
minorities?   
 
 Profiling gives an opportunity 
for security to harass ethnic 
minorities 
Total 
Disagree Agree 
White and Non-white 
categories 
White 410 30 440 
Non-white 195 74 269 
Total 605 104 709 
 
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
  
Pearson Chi-Square 57.099a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 55.458 1 .000   
      
      
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count 
is 39.46. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Although the overwhelming majority of respondents (605 or 85%) disagree that profiling 
gives an opportunity to harass ethnic minorities, differences are observed in the proportions 
of White and Non-White who disagreed.  A Chi-square test was carried out to see if these 
differences were significant.  The expected count in all cells was five or more so the test is 
valid.  According to the test (𝑃 =  .000) which is less than the specified .05 (𝑎 = .05).  
Therefore from this example the 𝐻0 would be rejected and consequently risk assessment does 
not apply equally to all passengers in the opinion of these respondents. 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
White and Non-white 
categories * Airport 
security legitimises 
discrimination against 
ethnic minorities 
709 99.7% 2 0.3% 711 100.0% 
 
Do you agree or disagree that airport security legitimises discrimination 
against ethnic minorities? 
   
 Airport security legitimises 
discrimination against ethnic 
minorities 
Total 
Disagree Agree 
White and Non-white 
categories 
White 428 12 440 
Non-white 248 21 269 
Total 676 33 709 
 
 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.706a 1 .002  
Continuity Correctionb 8.595 1 .003  
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Although the overwhelming majority of respondents (676 or 95%) disagree that airport 
security legitimises discrimination against ethnic minorities, differences are observed in the 
proportions of White and Non-White who disagreed.   A Chi-square test was carried out to 
see if these differences were significant.  The expected count in all cells was five or more so 
the test is valid.  According to the test (𝑃 =  .002) which is less than the specified .05 
(𝑎 = .05).  Therefore from this example the 𝐻0 would be rejected and risk assessment does 
not apply equally to all passengers in the opinion of these respondents. 
Finally, it is worth noting that whilst there are significant differences set out above in these 
three examples between White and Non-White groups the rejection of the hypotheses should 
be set in context to overwhelming responses to these questions.  The example below 
emphasises this point.  Here a Chi-square test was carried out to consider the significant 
differences between Whites and Non Whites on the question whether ethnic minorities should 
be subject to a higher level of checks.  The test was not valid because one cell (25%) had a 
count of less than 5 or 𝑁 ≥ 5 that three White respondents had agreed with the question from 
a possible 440 respondents.  Surprisingly more Non-white respondents (six) from 269 agreed 
that ethnic minorities should be subject to higher levels of security checks. 
 
 
 Do you agree or disagree that only ethnic minorities should be subject to 
higher level checks? 
   
 Only ethnic minorities should 
be subject to higher level 
checks 
Total 
Disagree Agree 
White and Non-white 
categories 
White 437 3 440 
Non-white 263 6 269 
Total 700 9 709 
 
 
• Passengers are supportive of high levels of security at UK airports (𝑯𝟎null) 
To measure this hypothesis it was necessary to review a number of questions in the 
questionnaire. The matter of security and being secure was the most popular concern to 
respondents responding to the open comments at the end of the questionnaire. One 
respondent said ‘Every single and necessary check should be carried out to make everyone 
feel safe, regardless!’ another ‘High security is important to all our safety those that 
complain are idiotic’ and ‘I believe that security is needed throughout the airport and the 
more the better’.  There are other supportive comments of security, clearly there are many 
passengers that want to see high levels of security to re-assure themselves of safety.  Only 
forty eight respondents participated in the open comments.  Table 26 asked respondents 
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whether there were too many unnecessary security checks. 680 or 96% of respondents 
disagreed and when asked about particular security processes respondents also appeared 
supportive.  For example in Table 34 79% of the 709 respondents agreed that the amount of 
items they were asked to place in plastic trays was about right. In Table 35 73% of all 
respondents agreed with been searched if they triggered the metal detector and 79% 
welcomed additional security such as body scanning. In Table 41 respondents were asked 
whether security was an important part of air travel, 81% agreed that it was and in Table 42 
96% disagreed that security was disproportionate to the purported risks. 
The data suggests that the hypothesis ‘passengers are supportive of high levels of security at 
UK airports should be accepted. Young passengers are supportive of high level of security, 
there was some indication, albeit small, that males are less supportive than females. This 
conclusion needs to take into context the hypothesis that passengers are treated the same.  A 
more accurate account might suggest young passengers are supportive of high levels of 
security but there are differences in this support with gender and ethnicity.   
The data analysis over a period of four years rejected two null hypotheses and accepted one.  
The data suggested that younger passengers do take longer to go through security.  However, 
rather than being under suspicion because their age is similar to that of terrorists who have 
carried out terrorist attacks, any delay is more likely to be attributed to their disregard and 
objection to security rules.  37% of respondents in this research disagreed with rules on the 
confiscation of liquids, including perfumes.82  Another factor was that 27% of them when 
asked questions relating to security measures answered incorrectly,83 yet 93% claimed to 
know the security rules.  These reasons appear to have had an impact of delaying respondents 
passing through security.  One more matter for consideration is the proportion of females in 
this survey and the high level of liquids, aerosols and gels (LAGs) were the items most 
frequently confiscated.  Females made up 62% of the respondents in this survey84 and LAGs 
was most frequent items to be confiscated.85 This might indicate that young females may take 
longer to go through security than males.  Data from the CAA at Stansted airport in 2014 
showed a significant differences in the time their respondents went through security than the 
other four UK airports in their survey. Stansted, did have younger passengers than the other 
UK airports supporting the findings in this research.   
Younger passengers do appear to take more time to go through airports than older passengers. They 
appear to be aware of security issues but relatively casual about certain rules that might impinge on 
their travel experience and they are prepared to question whether certain rules are necessary. This 
information can provide the sector with valuable evidence in designing security processes at 
airports to ensure resources are allocated proportionally to the threat and risk. 
 
                                                          
82 See Summary of data and Table 18 of the data output 
83 See Table 9 of the data output 
84 See Table 7 of the data output 
85 See Table 15 of the data output 
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Recommendations 
The following recommendations are based on the data analysis and wider findings from the 
CAA and other scientific research into UK airport security.  In addition these 
recommendations take into account changes that have occurred since 2011 and 
recommendation made by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism.   
In response to the first hypothesis, the research findings showed that young passengers do 
take longer to go through UK airport security, which was established in this research, and 
corroborate research carried out by the CAA. In addition, that the reasons why this profile of 
respondents did take longer apparently was by displaying some resistance to confiscation of 
items and those items were more akin to female than male  In a global business where time is 
critical to operations this is an important finding for the sector.  There is a need for: 
• Better education and training of airport security officers who are responsible for electronic 
screening to focus on passengers aged between 16 and 35 i.e. clear verbal warnings 
particularly to females, This strategy would reduce younger passenger times  
• Better security design for electronic screening so security requirements can be better 
communicated before passengers arrive in the area where items are to be removed. This 
can save time by preparing passengers. 
Since starting this research there have been noticeable improvements at a number of UK 
airports in preparing all passengers for electronic security.86 This has included better signage, 
strategic displays of prohibited items as well as web pages for most airports outlining their 
policy on security and prohibited items.  Improvements to waiting times for young passengers 
may require a more far-reaching approach as it appears from this research some young 
passengers object to certain items being removed because they are not entirely convinced that 
security requirements are necessary.  The EU Commission in 2013 authorised a new 
programme to investigate whether the restrictions on passengers who continue to carry liquids, 
aerosols and gels (LAGs) can be managed with the use of technology.87 In the meantime a 
pragmatic approach to this problem is the education of security staff to ensure they explain to 
young passengers which items must be removed whilst they are queuing for security checks.   
In response to the second hypothesis the findings showed there is a significant difference 
between white and non-white passengers’ opinion of profiling passengers and treatment when 
they have been stopped. The suggested recommendations are based on this research which 
suggests further work needs to done to ensure fairness, transparency and equality of security: 
• Training for police and designated persons who operate Schedule 7 to include issues of 
ethnic profiling and professionalism (refresher course every 12-16 months). 
                                                          
86 Katia Moskvitch ‘The new tech changing security at airports’  BBC News 19 May 2015 
<http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20150519-how-airport-security-is-changing> (accessed 13/0716) 
87 European Commission ‘Mobility and Transport’  ‘Air’ 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/security/aviation-security-policy/lags_en.htm (accessed 15/07/16) 
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• Intelligence led operations to determine suspected terrorists and further reduction of 
intuitive stops at airports. 
• A higher representation of ethnic minority police officers carrying out Schedule 7 
screening. 
In response to the third hypothesis that passengers generally accept high levels of security the 
recommendation is: 
• Review existing security process, consider whether they are legally compliant but also 
whether they are necessary, possibility of different security processes for very young and 
old passengers. 
Following the 2012 review of Schedule 7, a number of improvements have been made to 
Schedule 7.  The 2014 Code of Practice provides better guidance to police officers, requiring 
more officers to be trained, with the aim of reducing the number of other airport security 
personal who might be designated with the authority carry out Schedule 7 screening.  The 
reduction in recorded Schedule 7 screening is a good indication that there is now a more 
focused approach to its use. The facts in this research suggests there is still work to be done 
particularly when reviewing the respondent in the research experience of Schedule 7 and the 
series of questions he was asked that appeared ethnically driven ‘which Mosque did he pray 
at’   However since this research started there have been several terrorist attacks in Europe 
that have proved Schedule 7 is necessary.  
 
Conclusion 
The Brussels and Istanbul airport attacks in 2016 have shown that providing security for 
airports is challenging, with attacks been carried out prior to airport security processes in the 
case of Brussels and at the entrance of the airport checking bags in the case of Istanbul.  
These attacks are similar to those carried out in Glasgow in 2007 and Domodedovo Airport in 
Russia in 2011 all of which were committed ‘Landside’. Security planning and policing of 
UK airports through SeMS will need to consider how to respond to these new threats.  
After the Brussels attack, the CAA decided not to implement security prior to entering a UK 
airport.  There is no current requirement to screen passengers at UK airports prior to entering 
an airport building and such an idea was rejected by the UK government in favour of using 
extra police and dogs after the Brussels attack.88 
Security was in place before entering Istanbul's Ataturk airport but unlike Brussels airport, 
which only partially re-opened after 12 days, Ataturk was able to be open within 5 hours.  
There are arguments to suggest the Turkish authorities may have acted too quickly because of 
evidential issues. However, in opening the airport the Turkish authorities made an important 
                                                          
88 Tom Whitehead ‘UK airports will not see entrance scanners but extra police and dogs likely in wake of 
Brussels attacks’ The Telegraph 30 March 2016 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/30/uk-airports-
will-not-see-entrance-scanners-but-extra-police-and/> (accessed 12/07/16). 
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statement to other potential terrorists, which is that such bombings will not make major 
disruptions to their airports or way of life.   
The security impact on aviation and terrorism co-operation in general in the context of the 
UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU, will not be known for several years to come and 
whether matters such as aviation security will still require joint co-operation with the EU and 
beyond.89  Since 9/11, terrorism has no borders. This new paradigm has global reach and 
responses have required international collective action and strategies. As Beck states, since 
9/11 terrorism has become a new world risk.90 Airlines and airport operators are stakeholders 
in developing more business and security is a necessary but expensive counter weight to that 
development.  Aviation business needs a risk assessment model that complements both 
security and passenger flow, which is likely to require new technology coupled with 
professional staff.  
Since carrying out this research terrorist attacks have become more audacious and 
unpredictable.  The attacks in Paris, Brussels, Istanbul and London, for example, have shown 
that terrorism cannot be contained or controlled via security processes like those at airports 
alone. The UK response since 9/11 to counter-terrorism has been to adopt a reactive 
legislative approach to a series of events in the attempt to prevent further attacks. However, 
the recent attacks at airports are likely to require more than just legislation.  The government 
states that it is prepared to take whatever necessary measures are required to protect its 
citizens. This utilitarian approach to governance of security is likely to provide some 
satisfaction to the majority at the expense of the minority, which has consequences for not 
only relationships with the Muslim communities but for their human rights. There is a need to 
ensure government policy to counter terrorism can be put into practice in a way that more 
effectively targets those at whom it is aimed. 
 
 
                                                          
89 EC Regulation No 300/2008 amended by (EC) Regulation No185/2010 
90 Beck, U (2009) ‘World at Risk’, Polity Press  
